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Abstract
We propose an adversarial defense method that achieves
state-of-the-art performance among attack-agnostic adver-
sarial defense methods while also maintaining robustness
to input resolution, scale of adversarial perturbation, and
scale of dataset size. Based on convolutional sparse cod-
ing, we construct a stratified low-dimensional quasi-natural
image space that faithfully approximates the natural im-
age space while also removing adversarial perturbations.
We introduce a novel Sparse Transformation Layer (STL)
between the input image and the first layer of the neural
network to efficiently project images into our quasi-natural
image space. Our experiments show state-of-the-art perfor-
mance of our method compared to other attack-agnostic ad-
versarial defense methods in various adversarial settings.
1. Introduction
Existing defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks,
although able to achieve robustness in certain adversarial
settings, are still unable to achieve true robustness to all ad-
versarial inputs. The most effective existing defense meth-
ods modify the network training process to improve robust-
ness against adversarial examples [19, 25, 53, 36]. How-
ever, they are trained to defend a specified attack for a speci-
fied model, limiting their real-world applications and claims
of robustness to all adversarial inputs. Ideally, our defense
mechanism should be attack agnostic and model agnostic.
Instead of modifying the network and training process,
another line of existing methods achieve the desired prop-
erty of being attack-agnostic and model-agnostic by mod-
ifying adversarial inputs to resemble clean inputs [13, 17,
38, ?, 42, 48, 33, 45]. However, these methods show weak-
nesses in other adversarial settings such as being unable to
handle larger perturbations, unable to simultaneously han-
dle many different resolutions, and not scalable to large
datasets.
In this paper, we present an input-transformation based
defense method that achieves state-of-the-art performance
when compared to previous attack-agnostic and model-
agnostic defense methods. Moreover, our method is also
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Figure 1: Comparison of feature extraction between natural
image space and our learned quasi-natural image space. In
the natural image space, a neural network trained from natu-
ral images may assign different labels to the adversarial ex-
ample and the clean image, since they can be far from each
other in the feature space. After projection to the quasi-
natural image space, they tend to lie closely together in the
feature space.
far more simultaneously robust to scale of attack pertur-
bation, a variety of different input resolutions, and dataset
scale. We achieve our high level of robustness by project-
ing both clean and adversarially attacked input images into
a low-dimensional quasi-natural image space that faithfully
approximates the natural image space while also removing
adversarial perturbations so that adversarial examples will
be close to their original inputs in feature space.
We construct the quasi-natural image space in an unsu-
pervised manner using a convolutional dictionary learning-
based [4, 23, 9, 55] method, and we project the input im-
ages into our quasi-natural image space by introducing a
novel Sparse Transformation Layer (STL) between the in-
put and first layer of the network. We can further enhance
the robustness of our pipeline by retraining a classifier on
the quasi-natural images.
Experimentally, we demonstrate that our method
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achieves a significant robustness improvement in a vari-
ety of different adversarial settings compared with state-
of-the-art attack-agnostic defense methods. We also show
that our quasi-natural image space is able to provide a bet-
ter blend of preservation of image details and ability to
remove adversarial perturbations compared to other input-
transformation-based adversarial defense methods.
In summary, our contributions are:
• We propose a novel and effective attack-agnostic ad-
versarial defensive method that uses a novel Sparse
Transformer Layer to transform images so that cor-
responding clean and adversarial images lie close to-
gether both in our quasi-natural image space and fea-
ture space.
• We demonstrate that our defense method achieves
state-of-the-art performance among attack-agnostic
adversarial defense methods.
• Compared to previous state-of-the-art, our defense
method is far more capable of effectively handling a
variety of image resolutions, large and small image
perturbations, and large-scaled datasets.
• Among image-transformation-based adversarial de-
fenses, our image projection onto quasi-natural image
space achieves the best blend of image detail preserva-
tion and ability to remove adversarial perturbations.
2. Related Works
Adversarial Attacks Adversarial attacks are inputs that
are intentionally slightly perturbed to fool machine learning
models. Szegedy et al. [51] first introduce adversarial exam-
ples and generate them with the box-constrained L-BFGS
method. Goodfellow et al. [19] propose an efficient single
step attack called FGSM based on network linearity. Ku-
rakin et al. [26] apply FGSM iteratively and propose BIM.
DeepFool [35] finds the smallest perturbation crossing the
model decision boundary. CW [8] solves an optimization
problem which minimizes both the objective function and
difference between adversarial and clean images. Liu et
al. [28] generate strongly transferable adversarial examples
with an ensemble-based approach. Non-gradient based at-
tacks such as one pixel attack [49] and Zoo [10] do not re-
quire knowledge of network parameters and architecture.
Adversarial Defense via Network Modification This
type of defense aims to improve the robustness of the tar-
get model against adversarial examples. The most com-
mon method is adversarial training [19, 25, 53, 36] which
adds adversarial examples into training data. This class of
methods effectively enhances robustness to the adversari-
ally trained attacks but has poor generalizability to unknown
attacks. Other methods like feature squeezing [56], network
distillation [41], region-based classifier [7] and saturating
networks [37] modify the learning strategy based on gra-
dient masking [40] and smooth the decision boundary, but
they are still vulnerable to black-box attacks [8, 39].
Adversarial Defense via Input Transformation Input-
transformation defenses aim to remove adversarial pertur-
bation transforming inputs before feeding them to the target
network. Some previous methods treat adversarial pertur-
bation as high frequency noise and resort to traditional de-
noising methods to smooth small perturbations. [13, 17]
study the effect of JPEG compression on removing adver-
sarial noise. Osadchy et al. [38] apply a set of filters such
as median filter and averaging filter to remove perturbation.
Guo et al. [21] test five transformations and find total varia-
tion minimization and image quilting obtain good defensive
performance. These denoising methods only fix small per-
turbations and suffer from information loss.
More recently, other works have tried to purify adversar-
ial images through generative models. Meng et al. [33] pro-
pose a two-pronged defense mechanism and use a denoising
auto-encoder to remove adversarial perturbation on MNIST
digits [27]. Song et al. [48] transform adversarial images
into clean images using PixelCNN [44]. Although they
achieve good performance on small datasets, these methods
do not scale well to higher-resolution or larger datasets.
Pixel manipulation methods are also used to remove
small adversarial perturbations. Xie et al. [?] utilize ran-
dom resizing and padding to mitigate adversarial effects.
Prakash et al. [42] locally corrupt adversarial images by re-
distributing pixel values via a process we term pixel deflec-
tion. However, these methods suffer when they encounter
perturbations that are not extremely small.
Most similar to our method is D3 [30], which denoises
adversarial images by replacing patches with a sparse com-
bination of natural images patches. Further discussion of
D3 is reserved for Section 4.
Convolutional Dictionary Learning Convolutional
sparse representations are a form of sparse representation
learning [32] with a dictionary that has a structure that is
equivalent to convolution with a set of linear filters [18, 4].
It is widely and successfully used in signal processing and
computational imaging [20, 29, 43, 57, 58, 46]. Many
efficient algorithms [23, 4, 9, 55, 12] have been developed
to solve this problems. Sung et al. also recently introduced
a method that used a deep neural network to learn sparse
dictionaries for 3D point clouds [50].
3. Approach
3.1. Method Overview
Let X be the image space and Y be the label space.
fθ(·) : X → Y is a classifier parameterized by θ. Given
the classifier fθ(·) and a clean image x0, an adversarial ex-
ample xadv = x0 + η is an image slightly different from
x0 but confuses f :
d(xadv,x0) <  but fθ(xadv) 6= fθ(x0), (1)
where d(·, ·) is a distance function between the clean and
adversarial images.  is the perturbation scale which is often
set to a small number to get almost imperceptible difference
between xadv and x0.
Adversarial examples xadv are fabricated images and
usually lie out of the natural image manifold. This may
cause the network trained from natural images, even with
adversarial data augmentation, to map xadv far away from
x0 (Figure 1 Left). Our idea is thus to recover x0 as much
as possible by projecting xadv to the natural image mani-
fold. However, parameterizing the true natural image mani-
fold is practically infeasible. We instead leverage manifold
learning to build a low-dimensional space that approximates
the natural image space, which we dub the quasi-natural
space P in this paper. Along with P , there is a transforma-
tion T that maps an image (natural or spoofed) to P . We
require that T satisfies the following constraints:
1. fθ(T (xadv)) = fθ(T (x0)) = yx0 ;
2. d(T (xadv), T (x0)) .
Condition 1 requires that the classifier f assigns the same
groundtruth label to xadv and x0, which is our final goal.
To guarantee Condition 1, other than learning f to optimize
classification accuracy, we also introduce Condition 2 (Fig-
ure 1 Right). Condition 2 requires that xadv and x0 should
be situated closely in P , so that we can learn a quite smooth
function f satisfying Condition 1. This is important since
our f is a neural network, and learning a smoother map
would endow the it better generalization power.
We take an unsupervised approach to build the quasi-
natural image space. This space is constructed by stitching
multiple low-dimensional linear subspaces together. Prac-
tically, we cluster the training data into a few groups and
we learn a linear subspace for each group by convolutional
sparse coding algorithm [23, 12]. With this quasi-natural
space constructed, we are able to project any image to this
space by the sparse transformation layer introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2, which will remove a significant amount of adver-
sarial perturbations. Then in this quasi-natural image space
we can retrain a classifier to allow robust prediction over
adversarial examples (Section 3.5).
3.2. Sparse Transformation Layer (STL)
Given a classification network f , we add a Sparse Trans-
formation Layer (STL) between the input image and the first
layer of f . This STL layer projects the input (adversarial or
clean) onto a quasi-natural space, which removes nuisances
including adversarial perturbations in the appearance.
Let the projection of x be T (x) (assume that x is an im-
age ofC channels). The projection in our STL layer follows
from the Convolutional Sparse Coding algorithm [12]. This
algorithm learns a dictionary in a convolutional manner by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
{fi,c},{zi}
1
2
C∑
c=1
‖xc − T (x)c‖22 + λ
K∑
i=1
‖zi‖1
subject to T (x)c =
K∑
i=1
fi,c ⊗ zi
‖fi,c‖22 = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ c ≤ C
(2)
where⊗ indicates the convolution operator,C is the number
of input channels, K is the number of filters for each input
channel, fi,c|i=1,...,K;c=1,...,C denotes a set of filters, and
zi|i=1,...,K are the feature maps for each filter.
Different from standard sparse coding, which learns a
dictionary and code for the whole image, as shown by [52],
Problem (2) learns to reconstruct image patches by local
dictionaries and codes. Here, the local dictionary contains
the set of filters fi,c, and local codes are stored in the fea-
ture map zi. The convolution operation in the constraint
essentially computes the linear combination of local filters.
In vanilla sparse coding, a small set of bases are selected to
reconstruct the image. Similarly, in the convolutional sparse
coding formulation, a small set of filters should be selected
to reconstruct a local patch. To achieve the filter selection
goal, we have to enforce the feature map zi to be sparse by
adding the `1 regularization term.
In practice, we prefer to use a small number of filters.
This forces filters to learn major and expressive local pat-
terns on the natural image manifold. Moreover, from our
observation, having too many filters may cause extra fil-
ters to learn high frequency components, which can be used
to reconstruct arbitrary image patches including adversarial
perturbation that should be removed.
3.3. Learning Filters and Feature Maps
Plugging the constraint in Problem (2) into the objective
function, we see that Problem (2) is biconvex in fi,c and zi.
To solve this biconvex problem, we alternate between (1)
learning shared filters from clean images, and (2) learning
sparse feature maps for each input image with fixed filters.
Next we briefly introduce these two stages.
Dictionary Learning. Given feature maps, Problem (2)
becomes convex in fi,c. To solve this problem efficiently,
we transform to the Fourier domain [54] and use ADMM
algorithm as the solver following the framework of [12].
Sparse feature map (code) learning. Given fixed filters
{fi,c}, our objective function is again a convex optimiza-
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Figure 2: Pipeline of our defensive method. We first feed an image to a pre-trained Denoising Auto-Encoder and find the
cluster the image should belong to. Then we select the dictionary corresponding to the selected cluster and jointly optimize
the sparse feature maps and filters in this dictionary. In this way, we can project the input to the quasi-natural image space.
tion problem in zi. The problem is also known as Convolu-
tional Basis Pursuit DeNoising (CBPDN) [11] and we use
ADMM algorithm [3] to solve it.
3.4. Stratified Quasi-Natural Image Space
Due to the high inherent variation of natural images, it
is hard to well reconstruct all images using just a small
dictionary. However, as we discussed at the end of Sec-
tion 3.2, we also do not want to employ a too big dictionary,
because the big dictionary will span an excessively high-
dimensional space, inevitably covering a significant amount
of non-natural images. This would reduce the power of our
algorithm to filter out adversarial perturbations.
To circumvent the challenge, we split the data manifold
into several regions and learn an individual small dictio-
nary for each region. In this way, each image is still recon-
structed by a small dictionary, but we can still reconstruct
all images well using their corresponding dictionaries.
In practice, we partition the image space by clustering
natural image samples based on their perceptual features.
Generative models can learn perceptual features by recon-
struction loss. In particular, we find that Denoising Auto-
Encoder (DAE) [2] fits the adversarial setting well because
it is trained with noisy input and the feature extraction pro-
cess can modestly tolerate input noise. Specifically, we train
a DAE on both natural images and their noise-perturbed ver-
sions (Gaussian noise). In practice we find that the original
image and adversarial attacked version usually live closely
in the latent space learned by DAE. We then use the K-
means algorithm to cluster training data [14].
The clusters allow us to partition the natural image man-
ifold. Given an arbitrary input image (adversarial or clean),
we can obtain its latent features from the DAE and find the
k-nearest neighbors in the training image dataset. Then we
vote for the cluster the image should belong to. Once we
have found the cluster, we can either update the filters and
features maps for dictionary learning, or compute the pro-
jection of the image for classification network training/test.
3.5. Classifier Training in the Quasi-Natural Space
To train a classifier for image categorization, we map all
the clean training images to P . We simply use their recon-
structed version T (x0) to train a user-selected classification
network (e.g., AlexNet). To perform defense at test time, we
apply the trained classifier on the T -transformed version of
the testing image (clean or adversarial).
After projection to P , T (xadv) and T (x0) share close
perceptual and semantic features. Therefore, decisions
made in this quasi-natural space P tend to be more reliable
for adversarial examples compared to the original space.
4. Discussion
In this section, we discuss our unique advantages over
existing adversarial defenses and then analyze possible rea-
sons behind the effectiveness of our method against popular
gradient-based attack methods.
Relationship With Existing Methods In contrast to ad-
versarial learning methods [19, 25, 53] that rely on direct
knowledge of the attack method and model type, our algo-
rithm only relies on the clean training data at hand. Built
without any explicit prior knowledge of the attacker, our
design does not overfit to any specific attack strategy and
tends to be a generic tool.
Recent attack-agnostic defense methods use genera-
tive models to transform images into a low-dimensional
space [33, 48, 45]. We choose not to use a network to build
our low-dimensional space, since the generative network it-
self is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Another disadvan-
tage of these methods is that the limited expressive power of
generative models restricts the domain of these methods to
datasets small in resolution and scale such as MNIST [27]
and CIFAR-10 [24]. Pixel manipulation methods [42, ?]
can work on large datasets, but they only achieve good per-
formance under extremely small perturbations. Our method
works uniquely well on large adversarial perturbation, com-
plicated datasets, and higher resolutions.
The D3 algorithm proposed in [30] is the most simi-
lar to ours. It replaces noisy adversarial image patches
by a sparse combination of natural image patches. How-
ever, our method provides several advantages. First, D3
reconstructs images poorly on low-resolution datasets like
CIFAR-10 [24]. Second, the size of the natural patch dic-
tionary is very large (10K-40K) while we only need a small
number of filters (typically 64). The large size of their patch
dictionary has two main drawbacks: the excessive number
of dictionary elements may lead the dictionary to learn high
frequency components, which can be used to wrongly re-
construct adversarial perturbations, and the generic dictio-
nary elements are not as expressive as ours, so D3 generates
images that are not as sharp as ours as verified in our exper-
iments.
Robustness to Gradient-Based Attacks There are two
main concepts behind the effectiveness of our method
against gradient-based attacks: (1) Gradient Obfuscation:
Obtaining the numerical gradient of the STL is likely to be
challenging, because the output of the STL is the solution to
a non-convex optimization problem (has the argmin form
of the input image). Without the gradient of the STL, de-
signing gradient-based attack becomes difficult. (2) High-
frequency Perturbation Removal: Existing gradient-based
attack mechanisms often introduce high-frequency pertur-
bations. With a small dictionary and the sparsity constraint
in Problem (2), the learned filters tend to be quite smooth
(Figure 2), which could filter out the high-frequency pertur-
bation patterns.
5. Experiments
In this section, we first introduce our experimental set-
tings, and then show a quantitative and qualitative compar-
ison with other attack-agnostic adversarial defenses. We
demonstrate that our method outperforms the state-of-the-
art. Lastly, we perform an analysis of the intrinsic trade-off
between projection image quality and defense robustness of
transformation-based defenses.
5.1. Settings
We conduct experiments on CIFAR-10 [24], Ima-
geNet [15], and ImageNet-10, where we manually choose
10 coarse-grained classes from the whole dataset, e.g. bird,
car, cat, etc. Every class contains 8000 training and 2000
testing images.
We evaluate our method on VGG-16 [47] and ResNet-
50 [22] to defend against FGSM [19], BIM [26], Deep-
Fool [35], and CW [8]. We constrain the perturbation scale
‖η‖2 = ‖xadv−x0‖‖x0‖ to 0.04 (FGSM-0.04) and 0.08 (FGSM-
0.08) for FGSM and to 0.04 for BIM, DeepFool, and CW.
By default, we set the filter number K = 64, filter size
S = 8, and sparse constraint λ = 0.2. We first downsample
images to 32×32 to train a DAE, and split the latent space to
4 clusters for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-10, and 10 clusters
for ImageNet.
5.2. Adversarial Defense
We evaluate the defensive effectiveness of our method of
retraining a classifier on quasi-natural images and then pro-
jecting adversarial examples onto the quasi-natural image
space as described in Section 3.5.
Classification accuracy comparison results are in Table
1 for CIFAR-10, Table 2 for ImageNet-10 and Table 3 for
ImageNet. In Table 1 and Table 2 we follow our setting as
described in Section 5.1. In Table 3 we follow the experi-
mental setting in [21] and [30]. Although we compare with
other methods in their preferred resolution and datasets for a
fair comparison, we note that one of the unique advantages
of our method is that it performs well in various resolutions
(in our experiments, from 32 to 224), while others can only
work on a limited range of resolutions.
Comparison results show that our method significantly
improves the classification robustness against unknown
black-box attacks and outperforms state-of-the-art methods
in most types of attacks with a large margin. Moreover, our
retrained model achieves high accuracy on clean data and is
comparable to the clean model, which means we preserve
rich fine details that allow the network to learn discrimina-
tive features. Furthermore, we also compare our method
Adv TVM Quilting TVM+Quilting PDeflect STL (Ours) CleanD3
Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of image reconstruction results on ImageNet. The first column is input the adversarial
examples generated by FGSM [19] attack with L2 dissimilarity 0.08. The last column is the corresponding clean images.
Visually, our method outperforms others on removing adversarial perturbations and keeping input details. D3 refers to [30]
and PDeflect refers to [42].
Table 1: CIFAR-10 classification accuracy for adversarial
examples on VGG-16 after defense by methods in compari-
son. All methods are trained and tested on their transformed
data. “Clean” means accuracy of transformed clean data on
each method. “STL” denotes STL transformation with a
single universal set of filters. “STL (cluster)” denotes STL
filters are chosen through latent space clustering.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.9298 0.5816 0.6523 0.1803 0.1760 0.0936
MagNet[33] 0.9206 0.7393 0.8552 0.7707 0.8770 0.8594
PixelDefend[48] 0.9041 0.8316 0.8799 0.8515 0.8827 0.8845
STL 0.9002 0.8515 0.8732 0.8754 0.8838 0.8880
STL (cluster) 0.9011 0.8567 0.8715 0.8803 0.8890 0.8904
with the widely used adversarial training [25] and show that
we achieve better results on unknown attacks (Appendix B).
5.3. White Box Attacks
Our defense is designed primarily for black/grey-box at-
tacks, and like other methods, is highly susceptible to white-
box attacks, especially on ImageNet [15]. Nevertheless,
we show that our method is significantly less susceptible
to the white-box attack Backward Pass Differentiable Ap-
proximation (BPDA) on CIFAR-10 [1]. BPDA specifically
targets defenses in which the gradient does not optimize
the loss; this is the case for our method since our STL
is non-differentiable. Table 4 shows that although our de-
fense accuracy is hurt by obfuscated gradient-based attacks,
Table 2: ImageNet-10 classification accuracy for adver-
sarial examples on VGG-16 after defense by methods in
comparison at resolution 64 (Table 2.A) and 128 (Table
2.B). All methods are trained and tested on their trans-
formed data by their defense method. Here Crop-Ens de-
notes Crop+TVM+Quilting in [21] and PD-Ens denotes
PD+R-CAM+DWT in [42].
Table 2.A Resolution 64.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.8665 0.2816 0.3080 0.1883 0.0811 0.0751
TVM[21] 0.7555 0.5997 0.6930 0.7156 0.7210 0.7187
Quilting[21] 0.7741 0.7304 0.7418 0.7642 0.7646 0.7662
Crop-Ens[21] 0.7508 0.6968 0.7221 0.7369 0.7401 0.7304
PD-Ens[42] 0.8250 0.6634 0.7607 0.7903 0.7955 0.7813
STL 0.8438 0.7275 0.8002 0.8164 0.8163 0.8058
STL (cluster) 0.8421 0.7514 0.8038 0.8103 0.8221 0.8122
Table 2.B Resolution 128.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.8991 0.2123 0.2409 0.1790 0.0584 0.0504
TVM[21] 0.8567 0.7302 0.8181 0.8183 0.8221 0.8101
Quilting[21] 0.8354 0.7612 0.7914 0.8048 0.8164 0.8093
Crop-Ens[21] 0.8382 0.7640 0.7969 0.8033 0.8071 0.7955
PD-Ens[42] 0.8603 0.6740 0.8011 0.8273 0.8320 0.8262
STL 0.8784 0.7202 0.8308 0.8320 0.8560 0.8449
STL (cluster) 0.8721 0.7421 0.8356 0.8385 0.8494 0.8421
it is much more robust than other defenses with this phe-
nomenon on CIFAR-10 dataset.
On ImageNet [15], all defense methods in their case
study ([21] and [?]) get 0% defense accuracy. Under the
Table 3: Top-1 ImagetNet classification accuracy for adver-
sarial examples on ResNet-50 after defense by methods in
comparison. We follow experimental settings in [21] and
[30] where all attacks are in an average normalized L2-
dissimilarity of 0.06. All methods are trained and tested
on their transformed data.
Defense Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool CW UAP
No Defense 0.761 0.107 0.012 0.010 0.019 0.133
quilt[21] 0.701 0.655 0.656 0.652 0.641 -
TVM+quilt[21] 0.724 0.657 0.658 0.658 0.640 -
Crop-Ens[21] 0.721 0.667 0.670 0.671 0.635 -
D3 (40K-5)[30] 0.718 0.686 - 0.631 - 0.715
D3 (10K-5)[30] 0.708 0.683 - 0.646 - 0.703
D3 (10K-4)[30] 0.690 0.671 - 0.648 - 0.689
PD-Ens[42] 0.719 0.637 0.633 0.638 0.643 0.667
STL (cluster) 0.721 0.693 0.678 0.685 0.677 0.712
Table 4: Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA) [1] attack results on CIFAR-10, VGG-16. All
methods are attacked at distance L∞ = 0.031. Defenses
denoted with ∗ propose combining adversarial training.
Defense SAP [16] TE [5] LID [31] PD [48] MagNet [33] STL STL (cluster)
Accuracy 0.00 0.00* 0.05 0.09* 0.10 0.38* 0.42*
same settings, our defense accuracy similarly collapses to
1%. We further analyze our method’s robustness to other
simple custom-made white-box attacks with full knowl-
edge of our model (including dictionary coefficients) in Ap-
pendix C.
5.4. Input Transformation Effectiveness
Since STL has a strong reconstruction capacity, the pro-
jected images still faithfully preserve information from the
input data space. This is a useful property since it allows us
to use a vanilla model to partially defend against adversarial
examples when we are not able train our own classifier on
quasi-natural images due to limitations such as access to the
entire dataset.
Hence, we also evaluate the accuracy of using STL to
project adversarial examples of a vanilla model that was
pre-trained only on clean data. To perform the defense, we
simply project the input into quasi-natural space and feed
the projected image back into the vanilla model.
We compare with other input-transformation methods
applied to attacked vanilla models in Table 5 for CIFAR-10,
Table 6 for ImageNet-10 and Table 7). Qualitative com-
parisons of our input transformations are shown in Figure 4
for CIFAR-10 and Figure 3 for ImageNet. More results are
in Appendix E.
Under relatively large perturbations (e.g. FGSM-0.08),
all competing methods fail to successfully overcome adver-
sarial attacks while our method significantly outperforms
them. On slightly perturbed adversarial examples (e.g.
DeepFool and CW), we achieve a strong defense and also
maintain accuracy on clean data. We see that our method
Adv MagNet PD STL (Ours) Clean
Figure 4: Qualitative comparison on CIFAR-10 [24] with
MagNet [33] and PixelDefend (PD) [48]. The first col-
umn is adversarial images generated by FGSM [19] with
L2-dissimilarity = 0.08. The last column is corresponding
clean images. We can observe that MagNet cannot fully
remove adversarial perturbation, while PixelDefend over-
smooths images, causing large information loss and some-
times introducing colorful artifacts.
Table 5: CIFAR-10 classification accuracy of transformed
clean and adversarial examples on the attacked vanilla
VGG-16 model.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.9298 0.5816 0.6523 0.1803 0.1760 0.0936
MagNet[33] 0.9035 0.6145 0.6521 0.4312 0.6535 0.4845
PixelDefend[48] 0.8526 0.6810 0.7329 0.7729 0.7414 0.7579
STL 0.8285 0.7099 0.7487 0.7462 0.7854 0.7765
STL (cluster) 0.8360 0.7103 0.7547 0.7531 0.7959 0.7906
can effectively defend against adversarial attacks even us-
ing a vanilla clean model.
5.5. Trade-off Between Quality and Robustness
In transformation-based adversarial defenses, we typi-
cally aim to remove adversarial perturbations while preserv-
ing useful details. However, this is hard to achieve, as im-
portant details and adversarial perturbations are usually re-
moved together. Thus, we examine the inherent trade-off
between transformation quality and defensive robustness in
our method.
In our method, the key parameter controlling the pro-
jection quality is the sparsity constraint weight λ: a
larger λ causes more blurry results. We gradually in-
Table 6: ImageNet-10 classification accuracy of trans-
formed clean and adversarial examples on an attacked
vanilla VGG-16 model at resolution 64 (Table 6.A) and 128
(Table 6.B).
Table 6.A Resolution 64.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.8665 0.2816 0.3080 0.1883 0.0811 0.0751
TVM[21] 0.8172 0.3403 0.4744 0.6595 0.6943 0.6823
Quilting[21] 0.6318 0.4541 0.5312 0.5696 0.5436 0.5563
Crop-Ens[21] 0.5590 0.4570 0.5328 0.5369 0.5429 0.5320
PD-Ens[42] 0.7946 0.3388 0.5526 0.6568 0.6919 0.6827
STL 0.7925 0.5472 0.6825 0.7245 0.7562 0.7414
STL (cluster) 0.8017 0.5729 0.6914 0.7234 0.7652 0.7521
Table 6.B Resolution 128.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.8991 0.2123 0.2409 0.1790 0.0584 0.0504
TVM[21] 0.8591 0.2568 0.4386 0.6586 0.6360 0.6129
Quilting[21] 0.8149 0.3903 0.5889 0.6434 0.6242 0.5922
Crop-Ens[21] 0.7730 0.4622 0.6447 0.6876 0.7060 0.6888
PD-Ens[42] 0.8789 0.2333 0.4286 0.7221 0.7359 0.7272
STL 0.8654 0.4552 0.6418 0.7332 0.7308 0.7212
STL (cluster) 0.8759 0.4733 0.6606 0.7323 0.7301 0.7432
Table 7: Top-1 ImageNet classification accuracy of trans-
formed clean and adversarial examples on an attacked
vanilla ResNet-50 model.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.04 BIM DeepFool CW
No Defense 0.7613 0.0862 0.1140 0.0131 0.0106 0.0201
TVM[21] 0.6205 0.3123 0.4256 0.4923 0.5232 0.5012
Quilting[21] 0.4168 0.3787 0.3865 0.3823 0.3859 0.3783
Crop-Ens[21] 0.6432 0.4623 0.5546 0.5965 0.6023 0.5980
PD-Ens[42] 0.6821 0.3846 0.5691 0.6089 0.6220 0.6371
STL 0.6728 0.5348 0.6032 0.6253 0.6233 0.6158
STL (cluster) 0.6921 0.5588 0.6053 0.6348 0.6468 0.6220
crease λ and explore this trade-off (Figure 5). We de-
note Acc(x) as the accuracy on the vanilla model of in-
put x. Higher Acc(T (x0)) means higher transformation
quality because the projected images still preserve useful
information. Small ‖Acc(T (x0))−Acc(T (xadv))‖ means
the clean and adversarial examples are similar in feature
space. The decision can be robust if both Acc(T (x0))
and Acc(T (xadv)) are high. In Figure 5, we see that as
λ increases, Acc(T (x0)) decreases and the gap between
Acc(T (x0)) and Acc(T (xadv)) shrinks.
We additionally propose a metric to measure this trade-
off. Specifically, we use PSNR between T (xadv) and
x0 to measure reconstruction quality. For each method
in comparison, let a0 = Acc(T (x0)) and aadv =
Acc(T (xadv)), then we associate it with a characteristic in-
terval [min(a0, aadv),max(a0, aadv)] to represent its over-
all prediction quality. Apparaently, a strong method should
have an interval that is short (good robustness) and high
(good accuracy). We plot a 2D PSNR vs. prediction quality
map, where the top right corner indicates highest robust-
ness and prediction quality. In Figure 6, we show compar-
ison results of occupied regions on this map. Our method
achieves both the highest PSNR and most preferable charac-
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Figure 5: Intrinsic tradeoff between image reconstruction
quality and defensive robustness. (a). Transformation re-
sults of each corresponding λ. (b). Accuracy of T (xadv
and T (x0) on attacked vanilla model. (Setting: FGSM-
0.08, ImageNet-10, VGG-16, resolution 64).
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Figure 6: The PSNR, Acc(T (xadv)) and Acc(T (x0))
of different methods (Setting: FGSM-0.08, ImageNet-10,
VGG-16, resolution 64). For both axes, the higher number
the better. And less difference between Acc(T (xadv)) and
Acc(T (x0)) means higher robustness.
teristic interval, demonstrating its superior ability to achieve
robustness, accuracy, and maintain image quality.
6. Conclusion
We have proposed a novel state-of-the-art attack-
agnostic adversarial defense method with additional in-
creased robustness to input resolution, perturbation scale,
and dataset scale. Inspired by convolutional sparse cod-
ing, we design a novel sparse transformation layer (STL) to
project the inputs to a low-dimensional quasi-natural space,
wherein a retrained classifier can make more reliable deci-
sions. We evaluate the proposed method on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet and show that our defense mechanism provide
state-of-the-art results. We have also provided an analysis
of the trade-off between the projection image quality and
defense robustness.
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Appendix A. Overview
In addition to the experiments shown in the main paper,
we also compare our method with adversarial training to
emphasize the generalizability of our method to different
attack types (Section B). We also test our performance un-
der some custom-made white-box attacks (Section C). We
then analyze several key parameters of our algorithm from
the aspects of robustness and reconstruction quality (Sec-
tion D). Lastly, we provide visualizations demonstrating
the superiority of STL in achieving state-of-the-art perfor-
mance without loss of image quality (Section E).
Appendix B. More Comparisons
Through adversarial training, the model can reach high
robustness in defending a designated attack, but still has
poor performance to unknown attacks.
In Table 8, we compare our method with networks adver-
sarially trained [19, 25, 53] on a designated attack method
(FGSM attack). Although our method performs slightly
worse than adversarial training using data generated from
the already-known attack method, we do achieve compara-
ble, sometimes even better performance, on novel unknown
attacks. Please read the caption of Table 1 for more details.
Table 8: Comparison with adversarial training. Attacks are
named by type-L2 dissimilarity. Adversarial training was
performed on FGSM-0.08 following the popular method
introduced in [25]. On the designated attack method
(FGSM attacks with other parameters), our method perfor-
mans slightly worse than adversarially trained version, but
significantly better on the Uni attack (Universal perturba-
tion [34]), which is an unknown attack to the FGSM-based
adversarial training.
Table 8.A CIFAR-10, VGG16.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.04 FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.12 FGSM-0.20 Uni-0.08
No Defense 0.9298 0.6523 0.5816 0.3412 0.2002 0.6823
Adv Training 0.9158 0.9075 0.8890 0.8558 0.7732 0.8282
STL(Cluster) 0.9011 0.8715 0.8567 0.8258 0.7632 0.8642
Table 8.B ImageNet-10, VGG16, resolution 64.
Defense Clean FGSM-0.04 FGSM-0.08 FGSM-0.12 FGSM-0.20 Uni-0.08
No Defense 0.8665 0.3080 0.2816 0.2433 0.1887 0.3312
Adv Training 0.8358 0.8260 0.7983 0.7520 0.6576 0.672
STL(Cluster) 0.8421 0.8038 0.7514 0.7021 0.6468 0.7721
Appendix C. White-box Attacks
In Section 5.3, we have shown that although our method
is extremely susceptible to white box attacks on Ima-
geNet, we considerably beat all other methods on BPDA on
CIFAR-10. In this section, we further analyze our defense
under some other simple white-box attack settings.
The first attack leverages full knowledge of our dictio-
nary and directly performs attacks in the quasi-natural im-
age space. Under FGSM with L2 = 0.08 on CIFAR-10, we
achieved an accuracy of 0.6253 with our defense and an ac-
curacy of 0.5021 when no defense was applied. The second
attack adversarially perturbs the sparse coefficients, which
are then used to construct attacked images. Under the this
attack setting, applying FGSM (L2 = 0.04) on CIFAR-10,
the classication accuracy is reduced to 0.2515. We achieved
0.5628 defense accuracy by combining our defense with ad-
versarial training. We see that simple white box attacks that
use full knowledge of our dictionary are somewhat effec-
tive, but not as devastating as BPDA.
Appendix D. Parameter Analysis
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Figure 7: Parameter analysis of filter number K(a) and size
P (b). Unless otherwise specified, the default setting isK =
64, S = 8, λ = 0.2. All experiments are implemented on
VGG16, ImageNet-10 at resolution 64.
In Section 5.4 of the main paper, we have analyzed the
impact of the sparsity regularization weight λ in Eq (2). In
this section, we analyze the influence of other key hyper-
parameters of our algorithm: filter number K, filter size S,
and the number of subspace clusters M . We measure the
prediction accuracy of the retrained model on transformed
clean and adversarial data, denoted by Acc(T (x0)) and
Acc(T (xadv), in Figure 7. The gap between the two num-
bers reflects the defensive robustness and the magnitude of
each number reflects the reconstruction quality.
Filter Number K As the filter number K increases,
Acc(T (x0)) also increases, because more filters naturally
increases the representation power of the dictionary. How-
ever, on the other hand, Acc(T (xadv)) decreases as a larger
number of filters would inevitably introduce more compo-
nents to characterize image details, hurting our method’s
ability to filter out unwanted adversarial perturbations. Per-
formances w.r.t different number of filters are shown in Fig-
ure 7 (a). The visualization of learned filters at different Ks
is shown in Figure 8.
Filter Size S Figure 7 (b) shows that our method is not
sensitive to the selection of filter size. The visualization of
filters with different sizes are shown in Figure 9.
Learned Filters for Individual Image Clusters In our
experiments, we first split the natural data space into several
clusters based on their DAE features and then learn individ-
ual dictionaries. The dictionary of each cluster will learn to
capture some cluster-specific features. Filters and sample
cluster images are shown in Figure 10.
Appendix E. More Qualitative Results
We show more transformation results on CIFAR-10 [24]
(Figure 11), ImageNet-10 (Figure. 12 and Figure. 13), and
ImageNet (Figure. 14).
K=8
K=16
K=32
K=64 K=128
Figure 8: Filters of different number.
S=4 S=8
S=16 S=32
Figure 9: Visualization of filters of different sizes.
Figure 10: Filters and sample images for 4 clusters of ImageNet-10 at resolution 64.
Figure 11: Transformation results for CIFAR-10. For every pair of images, the left is the input adversarial image and the
right is the transformed image.
Figure 12: Transformation results for ImageNet-10 at resolution 64. For every pair of images, the left is the input adversarial
image and the right is the transformed image.
Figure 13: Transformation results for ImageNet-10 at resolution 128. For every pair of images, the left is the input adversarial
image and the right is the transformed image.
Figure 14: Transformation results for ImageNet-10 at resolution 224. For every pair of images, the left is the input adversarial
image and the right is the transformed image.
